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Introduction
Identification and estimation of both agents' value of a match in one-to-one matching models with transferable utility have been the subject of increasing interest in the last decade. Two important applications are in the fields of family economics with the marriage market (where the econometrician observes matching patterns, but not the transfers) and labor economics with the labor market, or more generally the literature on hedonic models (where the econometrician observes both the matching patterns and the transfers). Galichon and Salanié (2015) , among others, suggest techniques that implicitly or explicitly require to perform nonparametric estimation ("hedonic regression") of the wage curve prior to the analysis. While this works well in the case when the relevant characteristics is single-dimensional, as in Ekeland et al. (2004) and Heckman et al. (2010) , or discrete, as in Galichon and Salanié (2015) , this is problematic when the characteristics are continuous and multivariate. In this framework, Salanié (2015) shows that this structure implies very strong testable restrictions.
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In this note, we build a flexible and tractable model of equilibrium matching and wages on the labor market, and we show how to estimate the model using a maximum likelihood approach. This work therefore extends our previous work, Dupuy and Galichon (2014) , to the case when transfers are observed.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on compensating wage differentials initiated as an application of Rosen's (1974) hedonic model to the labor market by Lucas (1977) and Thaler and Rosen (1976) , soon followed by many others; see Rosen (1986) for an elegant presentation of the theory and a review of the early empirical literature, and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a more recent review of the empirical literature. The approach in this vein consists in performing the reduced form estimation of the wage-amenities gradient to uncover the marginal willingness of workers to pay for or accept certain levels of (dis-)amenities at their job. A crucial assumption of this approach is that the data contains rich enough information about a worker's skills to control for wage differentials due to productivity differentials across workers. For instance, Brown (1980) proposed using panel data to estimate workers' fixed effects and control hence for unobserved heterogeneity whereas Garen (1988) suggested an instrumental variable approach. Departure from this assumption implies an inherent bias in the estimates of the compensating wage differentials, and Hwang et al. (1992) have shown that this bias can be large. Our method contributes to this literature by proposing a structural estimation technique to derive unbiased estimates of the value of job amenities and productivity in a matching market where agents match on multivariate and continuous characteristics using data about a single market.
Our model is also related to a growing empirical literature applying the celebrated estimation technique proposed in Abowd et al. (1999) to decompose workers' wage differentials into differentials due to observed workers' characteristics, unobserved workers' heterogeneity and firms' heterogeneity using matched employer-employee firms fixed effects capture reduced form notions of workers and firms types that are fixed over time and are identified using the mobility of workers across firms over time.
The outline for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and characterizes equilibrium. Section 3 presents our parametric specification of the model and a maximum likelihood estimator on data about matches and wages. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
The model
The purpose of this section is to succinctly present our model, which is a bipartite continuous matching model with transferable utility and logit unobserved heterogeneity. In our context, equilibrium transfers (wages) are observed. This is relevant for instance in the labor market, as opposed to the marriage market where transfers are typically unobserved. We limit ourselves to the introduction of the notation needed for the construction of our estimator, emphasize on the additional identification and estimation results obtained when transfers are observed and refer the interested reader to the original paper for more details about its otherwise main properties. In the remainder, to fix ideas, we use the example of the labor market where typically transfers, in the form of wages, are observed.
2.1. Set up. Consider a one-to-one, bipartite matching model with transferable utility. Assume that a worker's characteristics are contained in a vector of attributes x ∈ X = R dx , while a firm's characteristics are captured by a vector of attributes
Let w (x, y) be the wage of worker x when working for firm y. It is assumed that worker x not only values her wage at firm y but also the amenities of her job at firm y and letα (x, y) denote the value of these amenities at firm y for a worker x.
As in Dupuy and Galichon (2014) , the value of amenities is further assumed to be decomposed into a systematic value α (x, y) and a random value ε (x, y) modelled as
Gumbel random process, whose definition is recalled in Appendix A. One therefore hasα (x, y) = α (x, y) + σ 1 ε (x, y) where σ 1 is a scaling factor. By Proposition A.1 in that appendix, this implies that the density of probability that choosing firm y is optimal for a worker of type x is given by
while the expected indirect utility of worker x is
Similarly, it is assumed that γ (x, y) measures the value of productivity when a firm y matches with a worker x. This value consists of a systematic part γ (x, y) and a random part η (x, y) modelled as a Gumbel random process, i.e. γ (x, y) = γ (x, y)+σ 2 η (x, y) where σ 2 is a scaling factor. A firm y employing worker x generates therefore profits γ (x, y) − w(x, y). Under this specification, one can show that the density of probability that choosing worker x is optimal for a firm of type y is given by
while the expected indirect profits of firm y is
It is assumed that there is the same mass of workers and firms, and that the workers' types x have a density of probability f (x), and the firms' types y have a density of probability g (y). Therefore a feasible matching between workers and firms, which 
.
We now define an equilibrium on this market. Definition 1. An equilibrium outcome (π, w) consists of an equilibrium matching π (x, y), and an equilibrium wage w (x, y) such that:
(ii) Matching π is optimal for workers and firms given wage curve w, i.e. be the deterministic joint value of a match between a worker of type x and a firm of type y.
Theorem 1.
Under the above assumptions: where (a, b) normalized so that a (x 0 ) = 0 for some x 0 ∈ X is the unique solution to the system of equations
(ii) The terms a and b that appear in (2.5) are related to the expected indirect utilities u and profits v that appear in (2.2) and (2.4) by
(iii) The equilibrium wage w is given by
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 1 suggests a few important remarks. is not necessary when in addition wages are also observed. Interestingly enough, this implies that both the scale of the deterministic value of a match φ and the amount of unobserved heterogeneity necessary to rationalize the data can be compared across markets when both matches and wages are observed in those markets.
Remark 2.3 (Identification of α and γ)
. The deterministic value of amenities α and productivity γ do not appear individually in the expression of the equilibrium matches in Equation (2.5), only the joint value of a match φ appears in this equation.
However, α and γ do appear separately in the formula of the equilibrium wages in Equation (2.7). This clearly indicates that when only matches are observed, one cannot identify and hence estimate the deterministic value of amenities α separately from the deterministic value of productivity γ whereas, in contrast, if wages are observed, one actually can identify and estimate these objects separately.
Remark 2.4 (The Becker-Shapley-Shubik model). When σ → 0, the model converges to the classical model of Monge-Kantorovich, which is a continuous extension of the model by Becker-Shapley-Shubik. Indeed, when σ 1 and σ 2 tend to zero, the scaling coefficients of the random value of job amenities and productivity ε and η, tend to zero, then the model becomes nonstochastic. Intuitively, when σ 1 → 0, the worker's expected indirect utility u (x) tends to the deterministic indirect utility max y {α (x, y) + w (x, y)}, and it follows from (2.1) that the conditional choice distribution π (y|x) becomes concentrated around the optimal firm y such that u (x) = α (x, y) + w (x, y). Similarly, when σ 2 → 0, firm y's expected indirect profits v (y)
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tends to the deterministic indirect profits max x {γ (x, y) − w (x, y)}, and π (x|y) becomes concentrated around the optimal worker x such that v (y) = γ (x, y) − w (x, y).
Combining these two results, π (x, y) becomes concentrated around the set of pair (x, y) such that u (x) + v (y) = φ (x, y), hence, in the limit when σ 1 and σ 2 tend to zero, we have
These are the classical stability conditions in the Monge-Kantorovich problem (see Under these restrictions, both the worker's and firm's problems become deterministic, and the conditional distribution π(y|x) in this case is concentrated at one point y =
T (x), where T (x) is the only assignment of workers to firms which is nondecreasing.
The equilibrium wage w only depends on x and satisfies the differential wage equation, namely
and an explicit formula for the equilibrium wage is obtained by integration. † Remark 2.6 (Continuous Mixed Logit demand). It follows from formula (2.1) that the density of market demand for firms of type y is given by
which is a continuous Mixed Logit model. Likewise, the density of market demand for workers of type x has a similar expression. The equilibrium wage w (x, y) equates these quantities to the respective densities of supply, g(y) and f (x) respectively. 
while γ is identified up to fixed effects d (y) by
This result has been exploited in a nonparametric setting by Galichon and Salanie (2015) and Salanie (2015) . In this paper, it is exploited in a parametric setting based on basis functions of x and y (see Section 3.3). Indeed, since α is identified up to fixed effects c (x), the parametrization of α can only include basis functions depending on both x and y or on y only but it cannot include basis functions depending on x only. By a similar reasoning, the parametrization of γ cannot include basis functions depending on y only. 
where measurement error i follows a N (0, s 2 ) distribution and is independent of (X i , Y i ). The latent wage W * i is assumed to be an equilibrium wage, and is thus related to (X i , Y i ) by
where w(., .) is as given by Equation (2.7).
3.2. Scaling. For the sake of readability and to avoid additional notational burden, we propose the following rescaling of the model. Replace α by σα, γ by σγ, φ by σφ, a by σa, and b by σb, so that the equations of the model become
where (a, b) is the unique solution to the system of equations
still normalized by a (x 0 ) = 0, and the terms a and b are related to u and v by u (x) = σa (x) + σ 1 log f (x) + t, and v (y) = σb (y) + σ 2 log g (y) − t (3.3) † and the equilibrium wage w is given by
This scaling is without loss of generality since from Equation (3.4) one can estimate parameters σ 1 and σ 2 and hence σ = σ 1 +σ 2 and therefore recover the pre-scaling values of α and γ. In the remainder of the paper, Equations (3.1)-(3.4) will characterize the model to estimate.
3.3.
Parametrization. Let A and Γ be two vectors of R k parameterizing the function of workers' systematic net value of job amenities α and the function of firms' systematic value of productivity γ, in a linear way, so that
where the basis functions ϕ k are linearly independent, and may include functions that depend on x (respectively y) only. Note that by definition, the function of the joint value of a match reads as
where Φ k = A k + Γ k . Inspection of Equation (3.4) reveals that, given the parametric choice above, equilibrium matching and wages are parameterized by (A, Γ, σ 1 , σ 2 , t).
The model is hence fully parameterized by θ = (A, Γ, σ 1 , σ 2 , t, s 2 ), which we make explicit by writing the predicted equilibrium wage as w(x, y; θ). where a(x; Φ) and b(y; Φ) are uniquely determined by system of equations (3.2). Since, by assumption, measurement errors in wages are independent of (X, Y ), the loglikelihood of an observation (x, y, w) at parameter θ is therefore log L (x, y, w; θ) = log π (x, y; Φ) − (w − w (x, y; θ))
and hence, the log likelihood of the sample reads as:
whereπ (x, y) is the observed density of matches in the data.
However, note that a, b and w that appear in (3.6) are computed in the population; here, we only have access to a sample, so we compute the sample analog of system (3.2), that is
with the added normalization a 1 = 0, which ensures uniqueness of the solution.
(Note that since we have assumed that the population distribution is continuous, each sampled observation occurs uniquely, hence the right-hand side here is 1/n; however, this could easily be extended to a more general setting). We denote (a i (Φ) , b i (Φ)) this solution at Φ. This allows us to compute a sample estimate of the equilibrium wage w i (θ) as
where the notation α ij (A) substitutes for α (X i , Y j ; A), and similarly for γ ij (Γ).
We are thus able to give the expression of the log-likelihood of the sample in our next result. Recall that θ = (A, Γ, σ 1 , σ 2 , t, s 2 ) and Φ = A + Γ. † Theorem 2. The log likelihood of the sample is given by
where
and, .7), and where w i (θ) is given by (3.8).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 motivates the following remarks. 
where Eπ is the sample average and E π Φ the expectation with respect to
Hence, the contribution of the first term is to equate the predicted moments of the matching distributions to their sample counterparts. The term logL 2 (θ), whose expression appears in Equation (3.11) tends to match the predicted wages w i (θ) with the observed wages W i in order to minimize the sum of the square deviations
Hence, the contribution of the second term is to equate the predicted wages with their sample counterparts. Of course, s 2 will determine the relative weighting of those two terms in the joint optimization problem. If s 2 is high, which means wages are observed with a large amount of noise, then the first term becomes predominant in the maximization problem. In the limit s 2 → +∞, the problem will boil down to a two-stage problem, where the parameter Φ is estimated in the first stage, and the rest of the parameters are estimated in the second stage by Non-Linear Least Squares conditional on A + Γ = Φ. In the MLE procedure, s 2 is a parameter, and its value is determined by the optimization procedure. where as usual, Φ = A + Γ. Denoting σ * 1 , σ * 2 , t * and s * 2 the optimal value of the corresponding parameters given A and Γ, one gets 12) which is the solution to a Nonlinear Least Squares problem which is readily implemented in standard statistical packages, and s
The partial derivative of the concentrated log likelihood with respect to A k is given by
and a similar expression holds for ∂ log l/∂Γ k . These formulas are proved in the Appendix B.
Remark 3.3 (Extension to missing wages). In many applications, data will come from surveys where typically non response to questions about earnings are frequently 16 ARNAUD DUPUY § AND ALFRED GALICHON † encountered. Our proposed estimation strategy extends to the case where, for some matches, wages are randomly missing. The log likelihood expression presented in Theorem 2 offers a very intuitive way of understanding how missing wages for some observations will impact the estimation. To formalize ideas, let p be the probability that for any arbitrary match the wage is missing. The sample is still representative of the population of matches, but part of the sample consists of matches with observed
, and the other part of matches with missing wages, i.e.
o is the number of matches with observed wages and n is as before the size of our sample of matches (we have re-ordered the observations such that those matches with observed wages are indexed first). The log likelihood in this situation is therefore
where logL 1 (θ) is given as in Equation (3.10) and logL 2 (θ) reads now as
thus p = n 0 /n. As n o tends to 0, and hence p tends to 0, the log likelihood function tends to logL 1 (θ). In contrast, when n o tends to n, and hence p tends to 1, the expression of logL 2 (θ) in Equation (3.13) tends to that of logL 2 (θ) in Equation (3.11) such that the log likelihood function tends to Equation (3.9).
3.5. Gradient of the log-likelihood. Let Da and Db be the two n × K matrices of respective terms ∂a i (Φ) /∂Φ k and ∂b j (Φ) /∂Φ k respectively. Let Π be the matrix of
, and letΠ be the same matrix where the entries on the first row have been replaced by zeroes. Let E be the n×K matrix whose terms E ik are such that E 1k = 0 for all k, and E ik = n j=1 π Φ ij ϕ k (x i , y j ) for i ≥ 2 and all k. Let F be the n × K matrix of terms such that
Lemma 1. The derivatives of the a i 's and the a i 's with respect to the Φ k 's are given by matrices Da and Db such that
Again, recall θ = (A, Γ, σ 1 , σ 2 , t, s 2 ) and Φ = A + Γ.
Theorem 3. (i)
The partial derivatives of logL 1 (θ) with respect to A k and Γ k are given by
and the partial derivatives of logL 1 (θ) with respect to all the other parameters is zero.
(ii) The partial derivatives of logL 2 (θ) with respect to any parameter entry θ k other than s is given by
The partial derivative of logL 2 (θ) with respect to s 2 is given by
(iv) The partial derivative of w i (θ) with respect to t is one, its derivative with respect to σ 1 is γ ii (Γ) − b i (Φ), its derivative with respect to σ 2 is a i (Φ) − α ii (Γ). The partial derivative of w i (θ) with respect to A k and Γ k are given by Appendix A. The continuous logit framework
Recall that the value for a worker x of the job amenities at firm y is given by U (x, y) + σ 1 ε (x, y) where U (x, y) = α (x, y) + w (x, y) is deterministic, and ε (x, y)
is a worker-specific random process. As in Dupuy and Galichon (2014) , we choose to model the random process ε (x, y) as a Gumbel random process, introduced by Cosslett (1988) and Dagsvik (1988) , which we now describe.
Assume that workers can only possibly have access to a countable random subset of firms. We call this subset of known firms a worker's "prospects". Hence, a worker can only choose to work for a firm within her prospects. Let k ∈ N index firms in a worker's prospects and {(y k , ε k ) , k ∈ N} be the points of a Poisson process on Y × R with intensity dye −ε dε. A worker of type x therefore chooses to work at firm l of type y l = y in her prospects if and only if l is a solution of the worker's utility maximization program
whereŨ denotes the worker's (random) indirect utility. The worker's program induces conditional density of choice probability of firm's type given worker's type, which is expressed as follows:
Proposition A.1. The conditional density of probability of choosing a firm of type y for a worker of type x is given by
while the expected indirect utility of worker x, denoted u (x) = E Ũ |x , is expressed as
This result was obtained by Cosslett (1988) and Dagsvik (1988) . The intuition of the result is that the c.d.f. of the random utilityŨ conditional on X = x is given by FŨ |X=x (z|x) = Pr Ũ ≤ z|X = x , which is the probability that the process (y k , ε k )
does not intersect the set {(y, e) : U (x, y) + σ 1 e > z}. Hence, the log probability of the eventŨ ≤ z is minus the integral of the intensity of the Poisson process over this 
and similarly on the other side of the market,
where a (x) = u (x) − σ 1 log f (x) − t and b (y) = v (y) − σ 2 log g (y) + t, where t is chosen so that a (x 0 ) = 0, thus t = u (x 0 ) − σ 1 log f (x 0 ). The potentials a and b that appear in Equation (B.4) are such that π ∈ M (f, g), i.e.
Uniqueness of such (a, b) such that a (x 0 ) = 0 is proved in Rüschendorf and Thomsen (1993) , Theorem 3.
Let us now show (ii). Taking the logarithm of Equation (B.1) and rearranging
A similar procedure using the expression for π (x|y) obtains,
Adding Equation (B.5) to (B.6) and using Equation (B.4) yields
By rearranging Equation (B.7) to obtain
one notes that since the right hand-side only depends on x and the left hand-side only depends on y, both these terms must be equal to a constant, denoted t. Hence, u (x) = a (x) + σ 1 log f (x) + t, and (B.8)
Let us finally show (iii). Plugging Equation (B.8) into Equation (B.5) and rearranging yields
which, using Equation (B.4) to substitute for log π (x, y), provides the following expression of the equilibrium wages as a function of α, γ, a, b and t, w (x, y) = σ 1 σ (γ (x, y) − b (y)) + σ 2 σ (a (x) − α (x, y)) + t.
(B.10)
Proof of Theorem 2. Immediate given the discussion before the Theorem. 
The envelope theorem yields an expression for the gradient of the concentrated log-likelihood with respect to the concentrated parameters A and Γ, that is ∇ A,Γ log l (A, Γ) = ∇ A,Γ logL 1 (θ * ) + ∇ A,Γ logL 2 (θ * ) .
The elements of the first part of the gradient are given in Theorem 3 part (i) whereas parts (ii), (iv) and (v) of Theorem 3 provide the building blocks for the elements of the second part of the gradient.
